The Influence of Risk Perception

The above theory contradicts entirely with the recognised theories of probability, widely thought of as the mathematical interpretation of “what actually is and what we actually know” (Berglund, 1997, p3). In particular, the concept of ‘epistemic probability’ relates to the theory of knowledge, in that what we actually know regarding a situation will have the ultimate bearing on the application of the degree of probability assigned to the occurrence of an event. As such, this concept develops the opposing argument to Nathan’s claims of social and life strategy as being the cornerstone to an agreed perception.

Further concepts relating to probability include the ‘frequentist’ approach, defined by Vose Software, 2007, as the fraction that is asymptotically equal to the probability of a particular outcome. This fundamentally means that if a process was to occur over an infinite amount of times, the fraction of times that a particular event occurred would result in the assigned probability of that event. This approach also holds no bearing to the social attitudes or the objectives of a particular group of people as Nathan would argue.

What is Risk?

Fundamental to this discussion is the appreciation of what risk actually means and how it is interpreted. In the context of health and safety, risk is an expression relating to the likelihood of a hazard being realised, taking into account the severity of harm that is likely to occur. Trimpop summarises the following interpretations of risk as provided by various authors:

"Schwing and Albers (1980) defined risk as a compound measure of the probability and magnitude of an adverse effect. Zuckermann (1979) referred to risk as appraised likelihood of a negative outcome. Kuriychuk (1989) split risk into Type A risk, defined as the tolerance of negative potential consequences in order to obtain higher gains, and Type B risk as arousal seeking without focus on reward parameters. Yates (1990; 1992) essentially treats risk as a decision problem. Hoe specified the major components or the risk construct as 1. Loss, 2. The significance of loss, 3. The uncertainty associated with loss".(Trimpop, 1994, p6)

Fundamentally, all of these definitions and differences in opinion provide a strong argument that risk is a subjective term as it requires an interpretation or estimate to be made. This estimate is made of both the likelihood of a negative event occurring and a presumption of the most realistic level of harm that may result.

With the above in mind, the ideology that a scientific approach can perfectly assign the level of risk to a situation is seemingly unrealistic and implausible. This is because the variables associated with the majority of real life situations are so vast that one model could never truly factor in all of them to assign an accurate risk rating. Even in a controlled environment, the likelihood of an event occurring varies over particular time spans.

However, the argument of frequentist probability asks us to review the probability over an infinite time span, in order to assign an event’s true likelihood of occurrence and the epistemic theory is based on what is known of a particular situation. In turn, both of these theories are based on the appreciation that certain variables are likely to change over time, be it in terms of new knowledge gained or changes in both the physical and the social world. These changes/improvements of knowledge will fundamentally affect the overall probability of the occurrence of an event over time. As such, it may be a plausible determination that Nathans argument of social and livelihood factors does hold relevance. As these concepts are two variables that are continuously subject to change that may affect the likelihood of an event occurring over a period of time.

Contextualising the argument in relation to a nuclear disaster

The outcome of a case control study based on the Fukushima nuclear disaster would realistically determine a link between exposures to a particular quantity of radiation to the development of cancer within the participants. As such, it could be argued that the severity of harm caused by such an outbreak would be extremely severe, leading to cancer or death.

Such a study would lend itself to determining the level of severity associated with a hazard, justifying the other half of the equation of 'risk'. In turn, Nathan's argument would not be influential to such a study, as the epidemiology study deals with facts surrounding both groups, comparing the differences and deducing a theory based on the evidence at hand.

The key element to this is the term 'evidence' as this will provide a sound reasoning and a considered justification to applying a particular level of severity to a hazard. Comparing this to the argument posed by Nathan, a direct quote from Nathan sums the issue regarding his stand point perfectly

"the individual rarely [has] the awareness of all elements of the situation...his evaluations are made with insufficient or biased elements of possibilities". (Nathan, 2010, p147)

Fundamentally, the quote highlights the major flaw with Nathan’s argument, that it cannot be justified on scientific grounds using empirical evidence. While it is an agreeable stand point that different cultures and individuals will assign contrasting views on the level of risk associated with a hazard, it does not mean that any one of them is implicitly accurate. As such, the term 'risk perception' can either be analysed as the general view of a group of people who have little or no empirical evidence to substantiate their beliefs, or the view of a group of specialists following careful consideration of all of the facts at hand.

Historical Events that Affect Risk Perception

When a particular nuclear incident occurs, the potential for damage to both human welfare and the economy is significantly severe. When an event is triggered, for instance the incident at the Fukushima plant cause by an earthquake and subsequent tsunami, the media coverage is extensive. In this particular case, the general public were exposed to a limited amount of information, which was generally focused on portraying a negative image of nuclear power.

The reaction to this coverage sparked intense debate around the world and lead to the Secretary of State requesting a complete examination of the UK Nuclear Industry. This was undertaken by the Office for Nuclear Regulation (an agency of HSE), in which the report concludes that

"licensees review their flooding studies in the light of the Japanese experience to confirm design bases and whether further enhancements can be made. This is in line with regulatory expectations for continuous improvement and learning from experience". (Weightman, 2011, p 207-208)

Fundamentally, the report suggests that the lessons learnt from the Fukushima incident centre around that of flood protection and design of building components. Interestingly, no recommendations regarding emergency protocol or location of plants were made as a result of this report.

If we use Cost-Benefit Analysis to justify the above outcome we may reach an ulterior conclusion. Cost-Benefit Analysis is

"an analytical procedure for determining the economic efficiency of intervention, expressed as the relationship between costs and outcomes, usually measured in monetary terms" (Kirch, 2008, p 168).

With this in mind, following further examination of the facts surrounding the Fukushima incident, the commission of this report may seem somewhat of a knee-jerk reaction. The World Nuclear Organisation published an online report detailing the findings of an ongoing epidemiology study of the inhabitants and workers of the Fukushima Power Plant. The report states that:

"No harmful health effects were found in 195,345 residents living in the vicinity of the plant...All the 1,080 children tested for thyroid gland exposure showed results within safe limits...government health checks of some 1700 residents who were evacuated from three municipalities showed that two-thirds received an external radiation dose within the normal international limit of 1 mSv/yr, 98% were below 5 mSv/yr, and ten people were exposed to more than 10 mSv...no deaths from radiation were reported...The psychological trauma of evacuation was a bigger health risk for most than any likely exposure from early return to homes" (World Nuclear Association, 2012, online)

This states that even as a result of the incident no one has been exposed to harmful levels of radiation and no one has died as a direct result of the nuclear incident. Furthermore, Japan’s geography and location is prone to earthquakes of high magnitude due to the fault line on which it is situated. Therefore, the likelihood of exposure to severe natural events is far greater than that of the UK. With these two facts in mind, it would suggest that the comparisons between the Japanese defences and the UK defences are not comparable. This is because the UK will be expected to over-design their stations as a result of an incident occurring in a completely contrasting geographical location.

The overall point to this discussion is that the public perception of risk did in fact influence further recommendations for reform in the UK nuclear sector. If the scientific evidence was consulted, it most probably would have defended the current UK standards and reform and inspection would have continued as previously prescribed. As such, Nathan’s argument holds significant relevance in respect to this scenario.

What are the UK Regulatory Requirements for Risk?

In the UK, risk management is a requirement of law, principally under the Health and Safety at Work, etc. Act 1974, and specifically under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999. The cornerstone to the legislation lies with the phrase 'reasonably practicable'. This terminology is a result of case law (Edwards v National Coal Board) and follows the same line of thought as prescribed by Cost-Benefit Analysis. That is to say that a control measure need only be implemented if the reduction in the level of risk (benefits) is comparable to the cost in terms of time, resource and money required to bring about such a change.

Risk Assessments are common ground in UK companies; however, it can be argued that the tool is not used as an accurate method of controlling risk, or in certain cases not even designed as an appropriate tool. As such, while the legislation requires a risk assessment to be performed, there is no recognised template for companies to adopt in order to meet this requirement.

As a result of this, it can be argued that the social and cultural interpretation of risk has an influence on the completion of risk assessment documents. This is because the interpretation of what is reasonably practicable will vary between health and safety experts, providing a subjectively considered quantification of the risks. As such, in order to fulfil their legal requirements, they would draw on their own perception of risk, which, as previously discussed, may not reflect an accurate interpretation.